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CASE NOTE
United States v. Alvarez-Machain: Extradition and
the Right to Abduct
He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster.
And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee. I
Stirring international relations, a divided Supreme Court re-
cently held that a United States-sponsored abduction of a Mexican
national from Mexico did not violate an extradition treaty between
the two nations. 2 Although admitting its decision "may be in viola-
tion of general international law principles," the majority reasoned
that an extradition treaty not explicitly forbidding the kidnapping of
a citizen from his nation is not violated by such a kidnapping.3 The
three dissenting justices labeled the majority's opinion "monstrous"
and forbode that, "courts throughout the civilized world ... will be
deeply disturbed."14 As predicted by the dissenters, the international
community expressed its outrage.5 The vehement objections to the
1 12 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 97 (Dr. Oscar Levy, ed., Helen
Zimmern trans., 1909).
2 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Black-
mun and O'Connor.
5 Mexico: "'Right to Abduct" Sours Mexico-US Relations, 1992 LATIN AMERICAN NEWSLS.,
LTD.,July 16, 1992, at 8; Mexico is Upset, THE HOUSTON CHRoN.,July 28, 1992, at 12 ("The
U.S. Supreme Court decision was a blow to the pride of a nation which has a long memory
of high-handedness by its Northern neighbor."); Canada: John Hay, Even Stupidest U.S.
Judge Should Know Kidnapping's a Crime, CANADA'S WORLD, July 15, 1992, at AI I ("Canada
with others should be persuading the U.S. government to renounce publicly and com-
pletely the doctrine that it is legally free to commit kidnapping in other countries."); The
Caribbean: "Right to Abduct" Rejected by Angry Caricom Leaders, 1992 LATIN AMERICAN
NEWSLs. LTD., July 23, 1992, at 8 ("As a world leader, the U.S. ought to take a better
course than that of a world bully."); Argentina: Reaction to U.S. Supreme Court Decision En-
dorsing Right to Kidnap Foreigners for Prosecution in U.S., NoTi-SuR-SouTsr AMERICAN AND CAR-
RIBEAN POL. AFFs.,June 30, 1992, at *4 (President described "the 'erroneous' decision as a
'horror.' "); Bolivia: Id. at *4-5 (Quoting theJustice Minister: "the U.S., with the title of
owner of the world, is declaring that there are no borders, sovereign states or legal organi-
zations in the world."); Brazil: Id. at *5 (Discussing the Foreign Minister's condemnation
of the decision "as contrary to the Organization of American States (OAS) charter");
Chile: Id. (Noting that the government "simply does not accept (the US Supreme Court
decision)."); Colombia: Id. (TheJustice Minister told reporters that "the decision is anti-
thetical to 'years of struggle for consolidation' of several precepts of international law");
Cuba: Id. ("The U.S. has no right at all - nor has anyone outside its frontiers granted it
the right - to impose its gun law, its law of the Wild West, its law of the jungle, its lynch
N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG.
Court's decision by the international community may signal that the
decision and its philosophical underpinnings represent the harbin-
ger of a new era of border raids, bounty hunters, and vigilante
justice.
This Note explores the implications of the Supreme Court's de-
cision in the context of international abductions of defendants subse-
quently brought to trial in the United States. 6 In Part I, the factual
background of this case and the court's holding are described. Parts
II and III provide the background law necessary for a clear under-
standing of the Court's analysis and its application of the law, which
is described in Part IV. Finally, in Part V, the Court's decision is
analyzed and critiqued. The Note concludes that the case severely
damages the integrity and legal value of treaties to which the United
States is a party. Foreign states also must question whether a prom-
ised "new world order" will require them to sacrifice their sover-
eignty in furtherance of a particular domestic agenda.
I. Factual Background
On April 2, 1990, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a resident
and citizen of Mexico, was kidnapped at gunpoint from his office by
thugs paid by the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA").7 Dr. Alvarez-Machain allegedly was involved in the 1985
torture/murder of DEA agent Enrique Camarena.8 Specifically, "the
DEA believes that [Dr. Alvarez-Machain] ... participated in the mur-
der by prolonging agent Camarena's life so that others could further
torture and interrogate him." 9 Dr. Alvarez-Machain was indicted by
laws, on other countries."); Peru: Id. at *6 (quoting a Justice Court president: the deci-
sion "constitutes an 'attack on the sovereignty of foreign countries.' "); Uruguay: Id.
("The Senate voted unanimously.., to condemn the.., decision."); Venezuela: Id. (Con-
sidering a revision of its extradition treaty with the United States); United States: Ruth
Wedgwood, A Dangerous Precedent, THE NAT'L L.J.,July 23, 1992, at 15 ("The court's opin-
ion met widespread public outcry. American citizens may see more plainly than the
Supreme Court or the Department of Justice that the structure of international law pro-
tects our own security."); Elka Worner, ACLU Demands World Court Ruling on Kidnapped Mex-
ican Doctor, UPI, July 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File ("A dozen
Spanish-speaking countries demanded that the U.N. General Assembly act on an interna-
tional resolution seeking a World Court ruling in the case.").
6 For an in-depth examination of questions surrounding jurisdiction of state courts
over defendants obtained by forcible abduction from other states, see Austin W. Scott, Jr.,
Criminal Jurisdiction of a State Over a Defendant Based Upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37
MINN. L. REV. 91 (1953).
7 United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd
sub. nom, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2188 (1992). Dr. Alvarez-Machain was abducted at 7:45 pm after treating one of his pa-
tients. Id. at 603. He is a medical doctor with a specialty in obstetrics and gynecology. Id.
at 602.
8 Camarena was kidnapped on February 7, 1985 outside an American consulate
building in Mexico. His mutilated body was found a month later approximately sixty miles
away from the place of his abduction. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601-02.
9 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
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a grand jury and awaits trial on these allegations.
Before resorting to forcible abduction, the DEA participated in
informal negotiations with representatives of the Mexican govern-
ment. After a series of discussions, the negotiations failed.' 0 Instead
of proceeding with a formal extradition request, the DEA offered to
pay for information leading to the arrest of the individuals involved
in the Camarena slaying." This offer for information eventually
evolved into a $50,000 bounty, plus expenses, for the delivery of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain to the DEA in the United States.' 2 The DEA agent
who made the offer confirmed that "the abduction and the final
terms of the abduction had been approved by the DEA in Washing-
ton, D.C., and [the agent] believed that the United States Attorney
General's Office had also been consulted."' 3 In early April of 1990,
the planned abduction succeeded and Dr. Alvarez-Machain was de-
livered to the DEA in El Paso, Texas.
The Mexican government immediately reacted by sending a dip-
lomatic note to the State Department which requested a detailed ac-
counting of possible U.S. involvement in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's
abduction.' 4 The note stated that "if it is proven that these actions
were performed with the illegal participation of U.S. authorities, the
binational cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking will be en-
dangered."' 5 In a second diplomatic note, Mexico demanded Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's return and stated that his kidnapping was accom-
plished with the knowledge that U.S. government agents violated the
United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty.' 6 In a third diplomatic
note, Mexico requested the extradition of the DEA agent who of-
fered the reward for Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction.17
Based upon Mexico's protest over his abduction, Dr. Alvarez-
Machain challenged the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to try him for his
alleged role in the Camarena slaying. Specifically, he alleged that the
Extradition Treaty was violated because Mexico had protested his
abduction. Violation of the Extradition Treaty was an affront to a
U.S. court's jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain. The district court
agreed and held that the only suitable remedy was to return him to
10 Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 602.
11 Id. at 603. An individual DEA agent made the offer but testified that "he received
authorization to make this offer not only from his superiors in the Los Angeles division,
but also from officials in Washington, D.C., including . . . [the] Deputy Director of the
DEA." Id.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 603.
14 Id. at 604.
15 Id.
16 Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
17 Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 604. The irony of Mexico seeking extradition
through proper channels of a U.S. agent responsible for flouting the formal extradition
process by plotting an abduction is obvious.
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Mexico, in accordance with the "long standing principle of interna-
tional law that abductions by one state of persons located within the
territorial sovereignty of another violate the territorial sovereignty of
the second state and are redressable usually by the return of the per-
son kidnapped."' 8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily
affirmed.' 9 The Court of Appeals based its affirmance on its recent
opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.20 In Verdugo-Urquidez, the
Ninth Circuit held that "extradition treaties proscribe government-
sponsored kidnappings. ' 2 1
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed,2 2 holding that the Ex-
tradition Treaty was not violated because it was never invoked. Be-
cause nothing in the Extradition Treaty specifically forbade forcible
abductions, the Court reasoned that the Extradition Treaty was not
violated by such an abduction. 23 Therefore, the kidnapping was not
even an extradition action. Finding that a treaty was not involved,
the Court held that forcible abduction was not a defense to a court's
jurisdiction over the defendant. 24 The Court based this holding on a
rigidly literal interpretation of the Extradition Treaty and nineteenth
century Supreme Court precedent. An appalled trio of dissenters
called the decision "monstrous" and predicted international
condemnation. 25
II. The Ker/Frisbie Doctrine: Abduction and Jurisdiction
In Ker v. Illinois,26 the Supreme Court noted that "forcible ab-
duction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when
brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try
him for such an offence, and presents no valid objection to his trial in
such a court." The defendant Ker, an American citizen, fled from
the United States to Peru after being convicted for larceny in Illi-
nois.27 The United States issued a warrant for Ker and sent a mes-
senger to Peru to receive Ker from the Peruvian authorities, in
accordance with an extradition treaty in force between the United
States and Peru.28 When he arrived in Peru, instead of presenting
the papers to the Peruvian government or making any request of
18 Id. at 614 (quoting United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir. 1974).
19 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir, 1991) (per curiam), revd,
112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
20 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991).
21 Id. at 1351. Similar to Dr. Alvarez-Machain, Verdugo-Urquidez also was a suspect
in the Camarena murder and was kidnapped from Mexico at the behest of the U.S. DEA.
Mexico also protested this abduction and sought the return of the defendant.
22 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197.
23 Id. at 2194.
24 Id. at 2197.
25 Id. at 2206 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886).
27 Id. at 437.
28 Id. at 438.
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them, 29 the messenger "forcibly and with violence" arrested Ker.30
Peru did not protest Ker's abduction. The Court held that the man-
ner in which the defendant Ker was brought to the jurisdiction did
not violate due process and the indictments would not be dismissed
solely because of the forcible abduction.3' Before reaching its hold-
ing, the Court also noted that "the facts show that it was a clear case
of kidnapping within the domains of Peru, without any pretence [sic]
of authority under the treaty or from the government of the United
States. '32 Nevertheless, Peru's sovereignty was only marginally in-
fringed because its ability to protect its nationals was not implicated,
nor was its ability to protect a treaty right.
Sixty-six years later, the Court in Frisbie v. Collins reaffirmed Ker
by stating:
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in Ker v.
Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444, that the power of a court to try a person
for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within
the court's jurisdiction by reason of a "forcible abduction." No per-
suasive reasons are now presented to justify overruling this line of
cases. They rest on the sound basis that due process of law is satis-
fied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having
been apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in ac-
cordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is noth-
ing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty
person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought
to trial against his will.
3 3
Collins alleged that while he was living in Chicago, he was "forcibly
seized, handcuffed, [and] blackjacked" by Michigan police officers
and taken to Michigan for trial.3 4 Collins sought his release from a
Michigan prison,3 5 claiming that his trial and conviction violated fed-
eral law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and therefore was invalid.3 6 Applying the Ker decision, the Court
denied Collins any relief from his conviction.3 7 Again, Collins did not
implicate national sovereignty or a state's ability to assert rights con-
ferred by a bilateral treaty.
The holdings of these cases developed into the Ker/Frisbie doc-
trine.3 8 Under this doctrine, "due process [i]s limited to the guaran-
29 It has been suggested that the messenger could not gain access to the Peruvian
authorities because Chilean forces occupied the city. Andrew M. Wolfenson, Comment,
The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 705, 723 n.96 (1990).
30 Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
31 Id. at 440.
32 Id. at 443.
33 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952).
34 Id. at 520.
35 Collins was serving a life sentence for murder. Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 523.
38 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir.), reh g denied, 504 F.2d 1380
(1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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tee of a constitutionally fair trial, regardless of the method by which
jurisdiction [i]s obtained over the defendant." 9 Until the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Toscanino,40 the Ker/Frisbie doc-
trine remained essentially unchanged and unchallenged. 4'
The Second Circuit's holding in Toscanino became recognized as
an exception to the broad reach of the Ker/Frisbie doctrine. 42 Tos-
canino, a citizen of Italy, was charged in New York with conspiracy to
import narcotics. 43 After ajury found Toscanino guilty, he appealed
by challenging the jurisdiction of the district court.44 Toscanino al-
leged that his presence before the court was illegally obtained be-
cause he was kidnapped from his home in Uruguay and brought to
New York only after being detained for almost three weeks of inter-
rogation and torture. 45 The treaty between Uruguay and the United
States was not invoked by the United States, nor did Uruguay protest
the abduction. 46 The court held that when a defendant alleges and
shows acts of torture so outrageous as to shock the conscience, a
court would be forced to divest itself of jurisdiction. 47 The court
based its ruling by examining the Supreme Court's more recent deci-
sions broadening the concept of due process to include protecting
the accused before trial.48 Based on this expansion of due process,
39 Id.
40 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh gdnied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on
remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
41 But see United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577, 583 (2d Cir. 1970) ("Whether the
Court would now adhere to them must be regarded as questionable."); Virgin Islands v.
Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043, 1045 (3d Cir. 1970) ("We recognize that the validity of the Frisbie
doctrine has been seriously questioned because it condones illegal police conduct.").
42 See Wolfenson, supra note 29, at 722-26.
43 United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 268 (2d Cir.), reh 'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380
(1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
44 Id. at 269.
45 Id. Toscanino alleged that he was knocked unconscious by a blow to the head,
thrown into the back of a car after being lured to a deserted area in the City of Montevideo
and driven to the Uruguayan/Brazilian border. Toscanino also alleged that at the border,
a group of Brazilians, under U.S. control, took custody of him and over the next three
weeks denied him sleep and nourishment except intravenously carefully calculated to be
the exact amount needed to keep him alive. Additionally, he allegedly was forced to walk
up and down a hallway for several hours at a time and if he stopped, he was kicked and
beaten. When he did not respond to a question, Toscanino claimed his fingers were
pinched with pliers and alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose as were other fluids
forced up his anal cavity. United States agents also allegedly attached electrodes to his
earlobes, toes and genitals and sent jolts of electricity cursing through his body. Id. at
269-70.
46 Id. at 276.
47 Id. at 274-75. The "shocks the conscience" standard was first applied in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). In Rochin, the state police officers frustrated the
defendant's attempt to swallow two morphine capsules by taking the defendant to a hospi-
tal where a doctor induced vomiting.
48 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 272. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 430-31
(1973) (entrapment defense); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (evidence from illegal
search and seizure); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (evidence absent warning of
rights); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruits of unlawful arrest);
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (use of electronic listening devices). See
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the Second Circuit reasoned that the Ker/Frisbie view of due process
must yield where such heinous acts were alleged. 49 The court also
based its holding on the fact that the Ker 50 and Frisbie5' cases could
be removed from the matter at issue: "If distinctions are necessary,
Ker and Frisbie are clearly distinguishable .... Neither case, unlike
that here, involved the abduction of a defendant in violation of inter-
national treaties of the United States."152 The court further stated,
"Ker does not apply where a defendant has been brought into the
district court's jurisdiction by forcible abduction in violation of a
treaty."53 Thus, although the Supreme Court did not rule on the
Toscanino case, a clear distinction was made when treaty rights were
threatened by vigilante justice. Both due process principles and rec-
ognized international law limit an unrestrained application of
Ker/Frisbie kidnapping jurisdiction.
III. The Extradition Process
Extradition is the "surrender by one state or country to another
of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside its own
territory and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which be-
ing competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender." 54
Extradition is not a requirement of customary law and many nations,
including the United States, do not extradite except as bound to do
so by a treaty.55 Usually if an extradition treaty is in effect between
the requesting countries, a person will be extradited only by the re-
questing country acting in accordance with the conditions set forth
generally Erwin N. Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation, 119 U. PA. L. REV.
711 (1971).
This reasoning may be precarious today after the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), in which the Court held that non-resi-
dent aliens are not protected by the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures when carried out by U.S. agents on foreign soil.
49 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275. The court noted:
Faced with a conflict between the two concepts of due process, the one being
the restricted version found in Ker-Frisbie and the other the expanded and
enlightened interpretation expressed in more recent decisions of the
Supreme Court, we are persuaded that to the extent that the two are in con-
flict, the Ker-Frisbie version must yield. Accordingly we view due process as
now requiring a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant where it has been acquired as the result of the government's delib-
erate, unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional
rights.
Id. The court also stated, "we think a federal court's criminal process is abused or de-
graded where it is executed against a defendant who has been brought into a territory of
the United States by the methods alleged here." Id. at 276.
50 119 U.S. 436.
51 342 U.S. 519.
52 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 277.
53 Id. at 278.
54 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (5th ed. 1979).
55 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 475 cmt. a (1987).
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by the relevant extradition treaty. 56 Extradition chiefly occurs
through diplomatic channels and such treaties generally detail a for-
malized process for making a request and require specific accompa-
nying information. 57 The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty
at issue is no exception.
A. The United States/Mexico Extradition Treaty
If the United States sought extradition of Dr. Alvarez-Machain
in accordance with the U.S.-Mexico Extradition treaty, the United
States would have been required to accompany its request with spe-
cific documents containing a description of the offense, the facts of
the case, the elements of the offense, the punishment for the offense,
and other information.58 Once Mexico made its decision whether or
not to extradite Dr. Alvarez-Machain, the Mexican government
would have promptly related its decision to the United States. 59 If
Mexico decided not to extradite, it also would have had to state its
reasons for the refusal.60 Generally, if the procedures in the Extradi-
tion Treaty are followed, the requested country must extradite the
individual requested. 6' Because Dr. Alvarez-Machain is a Mexican
national, however, Mexico would have additional discretion under
the Extradition Treaty to decide whether to extradite him. "Neither
contracting party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but
the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented
by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its
discretion, it is deemed proper to do so."62
Acting outside the Extradition Treaty usurped Mexico's discre-
tionary decision of whether to extradite Dr. Alvarez-Machain. On
some occasions, nations allow extradition outside of their extradition
treaties. The critical similarity to formal extradition, though, is that
the violated nation consents to action outside its extradition treaty.
Since extradition treaties are "in the nature of contracts between
nations," the signatory nations are free to waive the treaty's terms. 63
"Just as private parties may waive a term in a contract that is in the
contract for his benefit, so a signatory to an extradition treaty may
waive the requirement that the other signatory follow the procedures
set forth in the treaty." 64 For any waiver to be effective, it must have
been given voluntarily. 65 The waiver may come before or after the
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., The Extradition Treaty, supra note 16, art. 10, 31 U.S.T. at 5066-68.
58 The Extradition Treaty, supra note 16, art. 10, 31 U.S.T. at 5066.
59 Id. art. 14, 31 U.S.T. at 5069.
60 Id. art. 14, § 2, 31 U.S.T. at 5069.
61 Id. art. 1, 31 U.S.T. at 5061.
62 Id. art. 9, § 1, 31 U.S.T. at 5065.
63 Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1352.
64 Id.
65 Id.
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act of removal. 66 In either situation where the signatory nations op-
erate outside an extradition treaty, the principal act violates the
treaty, but the other nation's consent or failure to object to the act,
waives any objection to the violation or ratifies the unlawful act.67
B. The Doctrine of Specialty
On the same day that the Ker decision was handed down, the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Rauscher.68 In Rauscher, the
Court held that under the extradition treaty between the United
States and Great Britain, a defendant could be tried only for the
crimes for which he was extradited. 69 Rauscher was charged with
murder on board an American ship on the high seas. 70 After the
defendant was located in England, the United States immediately re-
quested extradition for the crime of murder, and England surren-
dered him to be tried for this charge. 7' Once in the United States,
Rauscher was indicted on a different charge. 72 After recognizing
that "a treaty is the law of the land,"73 the Court held that "the fair
66 Id. ("[A] nation may consent to the removal of an individual from its territory
outside the formal extradition process after the fact, by failing to protest a kidnapping.").
Cases demonstrating prior consent to the removal or expulsion are: United States v.
Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Thailand initiated, aided and acquiesced in
Valot's removal to the United States"); U.S. v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1272 (9th Cir.
1975) ("routine expulsions by Mexican officers of an undesirable alien"), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 985 (1975); Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d 142, 143-44 (9th Cir. 1967) (Mexi-
can police delivered defendant to Arizona sheriff); United States v. Kaufman, 858 F.2d
994, 998 (5th Cir. 1988) (placed on plane to U.S. by Mexican authorities), reh 'g denied; 874
F.2d 242 (1989); U.S. v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 978-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (involving de-
portation from Bermuda).
Cases demonstrating consent or acquiescence after the removal are: Matta-Balles-
teros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.) ("Without an official protest, we cannot
conclude that Honduras has objected to Matta's arrest."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 209
(1990); United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988) (no objection from
Panama); United States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) ("neither Guate-
mala nor Belize protested appellant's detention and removal to the United States");
United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (no protest by Bahamian govern-
ment); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 1975) (no allegation of a Canadian
protest was made); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.)
(neither Argentina nor Bolivia objected), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975); United States v.
Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.D.C. 1988) (no protest made by Lebanon or Cyprus),
rev'd, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
67 Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1353. See also United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420,
1422 (9th Cir.) ("The [extradition] treaty binds the two countries to surrender fugitives to
one another under certain circumstances. It does not purport to limit the discretion of the
two sovereigns to surrender fugitives for reasons of comity, prudence, or even as a
whim."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
68 119 U.S. 407 (1886). Justice Miller authored both the Ker and the Rauscher
decisions.
69 Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 423. ("[T]he fair purpose of the treaty is ... that the person
shall be delivered up to be tried for that offence and for no other.")
70 Id. at 409.
71 Id. at 409-10.
72 Id. at 409.
73 Id. at 418.
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purpose of th6 treaty is ... that the person shall be delivered up to
be tried for that offence and no other."'74 This principle is known as
the Doctrine of Specialty.
Specialty is based upon international comity. 75 "Because the
surrender of the defendant requires the cooperation of the surren-
dering state, preservation of the institution of extradition requires
that the petitioning state live up to whatever promises it made in
order to obtain extradition."'76 Specialty demands that the request-
ing country satisfy its obligations as a predicate to the surrendering
nation's decision to deliver custody of the defendant. Because of this
concern, "protection exists .. . to the extent that the surrendering
country wishes." 77 Thus, a country may consent to extradition for
one offense and, after the defendant is removed and charged with a
second offense, it may consent to the defendant being tried for the
second offense. 78 The ability of the surrendering country to consent
to a defendant being tried for crimes other than those for which he
was extradited is an important exception to the doctrine of spe-
cialty.79 The person extradited may raise any objections to the extra-
dition that the surrendering nation may raise.80  Once the
surrendering nation consents to trial for the additional offense, how-
ever, the person extradited has no standing to raise an objection to
trial for the second offense on the basis that it violates the doctrine of
specialty.8 ' Thus, the defendant's rights are purely derivative.
The Rauscher decision flows from basic principles of treaty inter-
pretation. As the Court implicitly recognized, "treaties are to be
construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain
their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history
of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties." 82 Another facet of treaty interpretation is a
court's "responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a mean-
ing consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting par-
ties." 8 3 These tenets of interpretation are necessary to preserve
sovereignty.
In 1927, the Supreme Court addressed related issues involving
74 Id. at 423.
75 Najohn, 785 F.2d at 1422.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); accord
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) (adopting reasoning of Court in Chocktaw).
Four of the current justices took part in the Saks decision; among them was Chief Justice
Rehnquist who wrote for the majority in Alvarez-Machain.
83 Saks, 470 U.S. at 399 (emphasis added).
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criminal convictions and treaties in Ford v. United States.84 Great Brit-
ain protested the seizure of one of its vessels by the United States
while the vessel was beyond the United States' territorial waters in
violation of a treaty between the two nations.8 5 The Court seemingly
limited Ker to cases in which no treaty is involved. The Court stated:
[T]he Ker case does not apply here. It related to a trial in a state
court, and this Court found that the illegal seizure of the defendant
therein violated neither the Federal Constitution, nor a federal law,
nor a treaty of the United States, and so that the validity of their trial
after the alleged seizure was not a matter of federal cognizance.
Here a treaty of the United States is directly involved, and the ques-
tion is quite different.8 6
The Court's language indicating this limitation, however, may be re-
garded as dicta, because the Court held the defendants waived any
claim to protest jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty before
challenging the trial court's jurisdiction over them.87 Still, the Rau-
scher dicta is consistent with treaty interpretation and the objective of
preserving sovereign expectations through international law.
C. General Tenets of International Law
In addition to their Extradition Treaty, the United States and
Mexico are signatories of international agreements recognizing the
territorial sovereignty of their sister nations. For example, both na-
tions are original parties to the United Nations Charter. The U.N.
Charter was developed in part "to establish conditions under which
justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other
sources of international law can be maintained."8 8 Article Two of
the U.N. Charter provides that the United Nations and its members
must "refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state."8 9 Although
customary international law regarding the use of force may be ques-
tioned, specific treaties cement the general tenet between signatory
nations.
Mexico and the United States also are parties to the Charter of
the Organization of American States ("OAS Charter") which pro-
vides as its purpose to "achieve an order of peace and justice .... and
to defend [the American States'] sovereignty, their territorial integ-
rity and their independence. '" 90 Governing principles under the
84 273 U.S. 593, 605 (1927).
85 Id. at 596.
86 Id. at 605-06.
87 Id. at 606.
88 U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
89 Id.
90 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
2417, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 50, amended by Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T.
607, 847, T.I.A.S. No. 6487.
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OAS Charter include the recognition that "[international order con-
sists essentially of respect for the personality, sovereignty and inde-
pendence of States, and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived
from treaties and other sources of international law." 9 ' These tenets
of international law provide insight into the mutual expectations of
the United States and Mexico when signing the Extradition Treaty
and aid in its interpretation.
IV. The Supreme Court Opinions
A. ChiefJustice Rehnquist for the Majority
In opening the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
the issue before the Court as: "whether a criminal defendant, ab-
ducted to the United States from a nation with which it has an extra-
dition treaty, thereby acquires a defense to the jurisdiction of this
country's courts." 92 In answer, Justice Rehnquist responded that
"he does not, and that he may be tried in federal district court for
violations of the criminal law of the United States." 93
In outlining the applicable background law, the Court recog-
nized Rauscher as illustrative of proceedings in which the Court has
occasion to entertain the alleged violation of an extradition treaty.
The Court quickly dismissed the relevance of Rauscher, however, by
observing that "[u]nlike the case before us today, the defendant in
Rauscher had been brought to the United States by way of an extradi-
tion treaty; there was no issue of forcible abduction." 94 The Court
proceeded to address Ker and prefaced its discussion by stating that
in Ker "we addressed the issue of a defendant brought before the
court by way of a forcible abduction" 95; thus making the relevance of
the Ker opinion appear obvious.
Turning its focus to the case at hand, the majority commented
that "[t]he only differences between Ker and the present case are that
Ker was decided on the premise that there was no governmental in-
volvement in the abduction; and Peru, from which Ker was abducted,
did not object to his prosecution. ' 96 The respondent, Dr. Alvarez-
Machain, and the Court of Appeals found these distinctions to be
crucial and, as in Rauscher, reasoned that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's pros-
ecution would be an affront to the Extradition Treaty. In contrast,
the Government contended that "Rauscher stands as an 'exception' to
the rule in Ker only when an extradition treaty is invoked, and the
91 Id. art. 5(b).
92 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2190 (1992).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 2191-92.
95 Id. at 2192.
96 Id. at 2193.
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terms of the treaty provide that its breach will limit the jurisdiction of
a court."' 97 Before discussing the merits of each position, the Court
commented that "[i]f we conclude that the Treaty does not prohibit
the respondent's abduction, the rule in Ker applies,, and the court
need not inquire as to how respondent came before it."98
After reviewing the Extradition Treaty, the Court remarked that
nothing in the Extradition Treaty obliged the United States or Mex-
ico to refrain from forcible abduction as a method of obtaining a
suspect from a foreign nation. 99 Abduction was never expressly for-
bidden, nor were the repercussions of such conduct described in the
Extradition Treaty.' 00 The Court focused specifically on Article
Nine of the Extradition Treaty which embodies the terms of extradi-
tion and held that "Article 9 does not purport to specify the only way
in which one country may gain custody of a national of the other
country for the purposes of prosecution."' 0'1 "Extradition treaties
exist so as to impose mutual obligations to surrender individuals in
certain defined sets of circumstances, following established proce-
dures."' 02 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist narrowly limited Article
Nine to situations explicitly covered by its language and seemingly
ignored the Treaty's overriding purpose to create orderly transfers
of individuals between the two signatory nations.
Finding nothing dispositive in the Extradition Treaty itself, the
Court referred to the "history of negotiation and practice under the
Treaty."' 03 The Court took notice of the Mexican Government's
awareness of the Ker doctrine and the fact that the Extradition Treaty
did not attempt expressly to diminish the effect of Ker.10 4 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that "the language of the Treaty, in the context
of its history, does not support the proposition that the Treaty pro-
hibits abductions outside of it terms."' 0 5 Seemingly, sovereign ex-
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 1&
100 lt
10I Id. at 2194. The Court apparently based this opinion on the idea that "[iln the
absence of an extradition treaty, nations are under no obligation to surrender those in
their country to foreign authorities for prosecution." Id. Under the Court's resolution of
this case, of course, whether or not a party participated in an extradition treaty, it would be
free to abduct the suspects of their choice at will, regardless of the suspect's foreign domi-
cile unless there was an extradition treaty in place which forbade such conduct.
102 Id. (emphasis added). The Court further stated that the Extradition Treaty "thus
provides a mechanism which would not otherwise exist, requiring, under certain circum-
stances, the United States and Mexico to extradite individuals to the other country, follow-
ing established procedures." Id.
103 Id.
104 Id The Court also remarked that language which would give the respondent the
relief sought had been drafted by scholars as early as 1935, but, again, nothing was incor-
porated into the Extradition Treaty. Id. at 2194-95.
105 Id. at 2195.
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pectations would not be respected unless the Treaty expressly
included them to limit United States common law.
Dr. Alvarez-Machain urged that the Extradition Treaty should
be interpreted in, light of general principles of international law
which clearly forbid international abductions. 10 6 The Court found
these tenets of general international law to be irrelevant because
''none of it relates to the practice of nations in relation to extradition
treaties," but rather to international law more generally.' 0 7 Explain-
ing its rejection of Dr. Alvarez-Machain's arguments, the Court
reasoned:
Respondent would have us find that the Treaty acts as a prohibition
against a violation of the general principle of international law that
one government may not "exercise its police power in the territory
of another state." There are many actions which could be taken by a
nation that would violate this principle, including waging war, but it
cannot seriously be contended an invasion of the United States by
Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the
two nations. 10 8
The Court also criticized the Court of Appeals for falling prey to this
position and rationalized that "[i]n a broad sense, most international
agreements have the common purpose of safeguarding the sover-
eignty of signatory nations, in that they seek to further peaceful rela-
tions between nations. This, however, does not mean that the
violation of any principle of international law constitutes a violation
of this particular treaty."' 0 9
Failing to find that the Extradition Treaty prohibited forcible ab-
ductions, the Court held that it was not violated and that Ker was
applicable."1 0 Thus, the Court reasoned that under Ker, Dr. Alvarez-
Machain's abduction posed no jurisdictional problems to the federal
courts."' The decision to repatriate Dr. Alvarez-Machain, as a mat-
ter outside the Extradition Treaty, ultimately was deferred to the Ex-
ecutive Branch." 12
B. Justice Stevens for the Dissent
In a scorching dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Black-
mun and O'Connor, distinguished Ker from the case at hand and
found that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction violated the spirit and
purpose of the Extradition Treaty. Justice Stevens described the
case as "unique" when compared with Ker, as the situation at issue
did not involve "an ordinary abduction by a private kidnapper, or
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2196.
109 Id.
1lO Id. at 2197.
I' Id.
112 Id. at 2196.
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bounty hunter."' 13 Instead of focusing his attention on Ker, Justice
Stevens relied upon Rauscher, the Extradition Treaty itself, and appli-
cable principles of international law. Taking a broad view of the Ex-
tradition's Treaty's purpose, and giving attentioni to its specific
provisions, the dissenters found that the majority's position reduced
the Extradition Treaty "into little more than verbiage." ' "1 4
The dissent acknowledged that there was "no express promise
by either party to refrain from forcible abductions in the territory of
the other Nation."' "15 Illustrating the illogic of the Court's position,
however, the dissenters posed an example of what Justice Rehn-
quist's holding would permit:
If the United States, for example, thought it more expedient to tor-
ture or simply to execute a person rather than to attempt extradi-
tion, these options would be equally available because they, too,
were not explicitly prohibited by the Treaty. That, however, is a
highly improbable interpretation of a consensual agreement, which
on its face appears to have been intended to set forth comprehensive
and exclusive rules concerning the subject of extradition. 1 16
Immediately, the majority's demand that Mexico anticipate all possi-
ble factual variations within Article Nine's scope was deplored in
light of the other accepted principles of international law.
Justice Stevens found support for his interpretation of the Extra-
dition Treaty in the applicable tenets of international law. He no-
ticed a critical flaw in the majority's opinion in that "[i]t fails to
differentiate between the conduct of private citizens which does not
violate any treaty obligation, and conduct expressly authorized by
the Executive Branch of the Government, which unquestionably con-
stitutes a flagrant violation of international law, and ... also consti-
tutes a breach of our treaty obligations."' "17 The dissent concluded
that the "Court's admittedly 'shocking' disdain for customary and
conventional international law principles ... is thus entirely unsup-
ported by case law and commentary."' "18
V. Analysis
Simplistically speaking, the majority and dissenting opinions in
United States v. Alvarez-Machain can be distinguished by which of two
cases, Ker or Rauscher, the authors believed better paralleled Dr. Al-
varez-Machain's case. Ker, which involved a forcible abduction of a
suspect from a foreign nation brought to trial in the United States,
earned the majority's focus and led the Court to expand the Ker doc-
trine to encompass situations in which the United States sponsors an
113 Id. at 2197 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114 Id. at 2198 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 2199 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
117 Id. at 2203 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
118 Id. at 2205 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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abduction. The dissent, on the other hand, viewed Rauscher, involv-
ing the interpretation of an extradition treaty and the implication of
terms not express in the treaty, as the fundamental starting point.
While the majority's opinion follows somewhat from Ker, the major-
ity relies upon an unexplained leap of faith from Ker to find jurisdic-
tion. The majority fails to explain why an abduction by a private
individual is dispositive in a case involving an abduction in which the
United States was a sponsor. The Court never acknowledges that
abductions by the U.S. Government, and not by private bounty hunters,
may present different issues.
The United States made pledges to respect and preserve the
sovereignty of other nations, Mexico among them. Sponsoring an
abduction of a nation's citizen from his homeland certainly is a
breach of these promises, especially when Mexico objects to the kid-
napping on sovereignty grounds. A private bounty hunter is not
obliged to respect the sovereignty of another nation; the abductor in
Ker was such a private individual. By ignoring this critical difference,
the Court leaps to the conclusion that if the Extradition Treaty was
not violated, Ker applies and the abduction is not an impediment to a
U.S. court's jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain. Measuring the
breadth of this assumption depends upon the credibility of the ma-
jority's reading of Article Nine to waive sovereignty concerns in situ-
ations not expressly covered by the Treaty.
In interpreting the Extradition Treaty, the majority approached
the issue convinced that if the Extradition Treaty did not prohibit
abductions expressly or implicitly, then such an abduction does not
violate the Extradition Treaty. In contrast, the dissent began with
the approach that absent some evidence that the nations desired to
reserve abduction as an option, the Extradition Treaty would be vio-
lated by such an abduction. As Justice Cardozo explained "the one
construction invigorates the [A]ct; the other saps its life. A choice
between them is not hard."' "19
The Court's decision to severely limit the Extradition Treaty is
rife with generalizations and unexplained conclusions. Although the
Court stated that "[tireaties are construed more liberally than pri-
vate agreements," 2 0 the majority reads the Extradition Treaty with a
literalism which strains the purpose of the Extradition Treaty specifi-
cally and the purposes of extradition generally. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist ignores the details contained in the Extradition Treaty which
cover evidentiary, documentary, and procedural requirements, and
extradition policy with regard to capital punishment, among other
provisions.' 2 ' The majority's version of treaty interpretation is
119 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo,J. dissenting).
120 Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943).
121 Extradition Treaty, supra note 16.
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based on a notion that throughout the negotiations and drafting of
the Extradition Treaty both nations consciously preserved the option
to scrap the extradition scheme by abducting criminal defendants.
While this reading seriously restricts the Treaty's significance, its
only support is the majority's speculative view that the parties' failure
to mention abduction specifically waived the application of any inter-
national law, customary or contractual, to it. Furthermore, the Court
so decides despite its pronunciation that "it is our responsibility to give
the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared
expectations of the contracting parties."' 122 The majority's position
is untenable. 123 "No government-[and] certainly no Mexican gov-
ernment-would have agreed to an extradition treaty if it was under-
stood that the United States government considered any right of
extradition subject to an overriding privilege of abduction. Any
American [P]resident who conceded the right of a foreign state to
abduct American citizens would be subject to impeachment."' 124 If,
however, the Court is correct, then the nations of Germany, Japan,
the United Kingdom, and Canada must have so understood, because
their extradition treaties with the United States do not expressly for-
bid kidnapping.12 5
To further support its interpretation, the Court relies upon
Mexico's "awareness" of the Ker decision and a 1935 article detailing
how a treaty provision might be drafted to avoid the Ker result. 126
The Court, however, neglects to take notice of international develop-
ments since 1935, which include both nations' recognition of the
U.N. and OAS Charters. In these documents, both nations pledged
to refrain from acts of aggression and to respect the sovereignty of
the other nation. The Court discounted Dr. Alvarez-Machain's argu-
ment that these documents demonstrate the nations' intent to pre-
clude unilateral, forcible abductions, reasoning that "[t]here are
many actions which could be taken by a nation that would violate"
the international principle that one nation may not exercise its police
122 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)(emphasis added). Current Justices
White, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in Justice O'Connor's opinion.
123 "(Elven by Justice Antonin Scalia's new 'show me where it says we can't' school of
textual interpretation, the majority's opinion is hard to square. After all, the United
States-Mexico treaty makes kidnapping itself a crime for which extradition must be
granted unless the kidnapper is prosecuted domestically." Charles L. Hobson, The Treaty
Was Not Violated, THE NATiONAL L. J., July 6, 1992, at 15.
124 Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Supreme Court's Kidnapping Ruling is Manifestly Wrong,
ROLL CALL, July 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Int'l File.
125 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many Concerning Extradition, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., 32 U.S.T. 1485; Treaty on Ex-
tradition Between the United States of America and Japan, Mar. 3, 1978, U.S.-Japan, 31
U.S.T. 892; Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June
8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227; Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of
America and Canada, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Can., 27 U.S.T. 983.
126 Harvard Research in International Law, 29 AM. J. INr'L L. 442 (Supp. 1935).
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power in the territory of another nation, "including waging war, but
it cannot seriously be contended an invasion of the United States by
Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between the
two nations." 2 7 Here, the Court attempts to weaken the effect of
these agreements by generalizing and clouding the issue. Dr. Alva-
rez-Machain was not asserting that an invasion of the United States
by Mexico violates the Extradition Treaty. Instead, Dr. Alvarez-
Machain urged that his abduction accomplished under the color of
U.S. authority violated the Extradition Treaty; a treaty which covers
the exact nature of the action at issue. Furthermore, Mexico's objec-
tion to the kidnapping clearly implicates the Treaty's respect for the
signatories' mutual sovereignty and does not involve disputes far re-
moved from the letter and spirit of the Treaty. Even if a forcible,
non-consensual abduction does not violate the letter of the Extradi-
tion Treaty, it certainly contradicts the spirit of the Treaty.
Following the majority's approach to treaty interpretation, trea-
ties would have to become detailed to the point of rigid formality
and over-inclusion. Treaties would be required to cover every situa-
tion or scenario, for if a situation were not so described, the parties
could be deemed to have acquiesced to the act regardless of their
mutual expectations. Following the dissent's approach, treaties
could be flexibile in wording, because some basic assumptions as to
the parties' intentions would not have to be explicitly expressed. In-
stead, a treaty read in light of international principles could reduce
the need to enumerate the parties' response to each possible scena-
rio. The dissent's interpretive method is the only plausible approach
to preserving the value of treaties generally and the sovereign expec-
tations of Mexico specifically.
The Court's decision marks a significant regress from respecting
the sovereignty of nations and promoting good will. International
relations suffer from the kidnapping of citizens within another na-
tion's borders. 128 International trade also suffers because the safety
of normal transportation routes becomes questionable.' 29 Such ac-
tions also deprive individuals the security of knowing that "they may
rely on the established framework of state sovereignty and state
boundaries in carrying on their personal and political activities."'13 0
The potential repercussions of such conduct are ominous.' 3 ' The
district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized this
potential and sought to counteract it.I32 In a related companion
127 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (1992).
128 See Thomas H. Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INT'L LAw. 27 (1971).
129 Id. at 27.
Iso Id.
131 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
132 Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d at 1362.
[VOL. 18
RIGHT TO ABDUCT
case, the Court of Appeals recognized:
Although the principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be
obeyed) has not always been scrupulously followed in the affairs of
this and other nations, if we are to see the emergence of a "new
world order" in which the use of force is to be subject to the rule of
law, we must begin by holding our own government to its funda-
mental legal commitments,133
Respecting international legal obligations, including sovereignty, is
essential to promoting multinational relations, regardless of tempo-
rary blows to one nation's domestic agenda.
The potential negative result of rejecting jurisdiction is repatria-
tion of a doctor who allegedly kept Agent Camarena alive so he
could be further tortured.13 4 While following the proper extradition
procedures may have resulted in the Mexican government surren-
dering Dr. Alvarez-Machain for trial in the United States, this result
was unlikely considering Mexico's traditional reluctance to extradite
its citizens for trial.13 5 As the story behind this case indicates, cor-
ruption in the refuge nation's government may be widespread; the
investigation surrounding the death of Agent Camarena implicated,
among others, several former Mexican police officers,' 3 6 the Mexi-
can police commander initially handling the investigation,' 7 Mex-
ico's then attorney general,' 38 and the brother-in-law of a former
Mexican President.' 3 9 Recognition of such corruption in foreign
governments has prompted one commentator to write, "[t]he U.S.
Constitution menaces justice and the rule of law when applied in for-
eign lands whose political cultures and legal mores are alien to those
133 Id.
1s4 Id.
135 See Kim Murphy, Extradition from Mexico: It's Tricky Going; Nation Historically Reluctant
to Turn Over Citizens for Prosecution Despite Treaty, L.A. TIMES (Home Ed.), Apr. 20, 1989, at 3
("Though the treaty technically allows for the extradition of Mexican nationals from Mex-
ico, U.S. officials could not recall such an instance."). Mexico reserved the discretion over
whether it would extradite its own citizens in the Extradition Treaty. Extradition Treaty,
supra note 16, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5065. Dr. Machain's abduction denied Mexico the op-
portunity to exercise this discretion.
136 Kim Murphy, 9 Indicted in Murder of Drug Agent in Mexico; Narcotics Lord and Former
Police Officials Named in Torture-Killing of DEA 's Camarena, L.A. TIMES (Home Ed.), Jan. 7,
1988, at 1.
137 Id. ("Nine men, including ... the Mexican police commander who headed the
original murder investigation, were indicted Wednesday in the torture and death of U.S.
drug agent Enrique Camarena and his pilot in 1985.").
138 Henry Weinstein, Testimony Implicates Atty. Gen. of Mexico: Drugs: DEA Agent Says a
Defendant in the Camarena Murder Trial Told Him the Official, While a Governor, 'Was Involved'
with Traffickers, L.A. TIMES (Home Ed.), May 31, 1990, at BI. ("A Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration agent testified Wednesday that a defendant in the Enrique Camarena murder
trial told him last July that Mexico's attorney general 'was involved' with drug traffickers
while he was governor of the Mexican state of Jalisco in the mid-1980s.")
139 Henry Weinstein, Camarena Indictment Names Business Figure; Narcotics: Ruben Zuno
Arce is the 16th Person to be Charged in the Kidnap-Murder of the U.S. Drug Agent. He is a Brother-
in-Law of a Former President of Mexico, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1989, at A3.
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of the USA."' 40 The commentator was applauding the "twin pro-
nouncements"' 4 ' of a Supreme Court decision refusing to apply the
Fourth Amendment to the search and seizure of a nonresident
alien's property on foreign soil 142 and a Justice Department state-
ment giving the FBI authority to arrest persons abroad for offenses
against the United States. 143
In his thirst for vengeance, the commentator fails to recognize
the significance that U.S. actions have in the international arena. As
Justice Brandeis so poignantly stated:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imper-
illed if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the
potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by
its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the adminis-
tration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to declare
that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the con-
viction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. 144
The United States must act as an example by promoting democ-
racy, human rights and respect for other nations; adhering to the
U.S. Constitution and the treaties which the United States signs is
essential to the promotion of peace and democratic ideals. Hiring
thugs to kidnap a suspect from his home country, without that coun-
try's consent, to stand trial in the United States equates to promoting
lawlessness. Such an action also demonstrates that certain govern-
ments may act outside the law and without respect for its neighbors.
The Supreme Court was a bastion of hope to save the United States
from impugning Mexico's sovereignty. The Court had the tools: a
valid extradition treaty, negotiated after the development of the U.N.
Charter and the OAS Charter; the vocal protests of an outraged
Mexican government, which made the abduction non-consensual;
and the limitations to Ker/Frisbie based on treaty interpretation. To
the detriment of United States-Mexico relations, the majority failed
to recognize the true nature of the Extradition Treaty and eroded
the foundations of extradition generally. Unfortunately, the world
soon may feel the reverberations. Through its holding, the Court
injures the United States' image as a friend to the international com-
munity and weakens the view of the United States as a democratic
country in which the court system acts independently from the polit-
ical machinery when rendering its decisions. The Court also implic-
140 Bruce Fein, USA Must Act to Fight Crime Abroad, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 1990, at 8A.
141 Id.
142 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
143 Fein, supra note 140, at 8A. ("These twin pronouncements are imperative to en-
lightened and effective law enforcement in a world where official corruption, lassitude or
anti-Americanism are the earmarks of several nations.").
144 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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itly encourages other nations to conduct their own versions of
vigilante justice without regard for the borders of sovereign nations.
The fate of the principle established by this decision is unclear.
Anti-kidnapping legislation was being discussed bymembers of Con-
gress in late July.' 45 Facing a predicted veto by President Bush,
Congress is delaying the progress of legislation until after the No-
vember elections.' 46
VI. Conclusion
Back in the days of the Wild West, American bounty hunters had no hesi-
tation about crossing an international border, kidnapping afigitive and bring-
ing him home for trial. 147
A majority of the Supreme Court succumbed to the appeal for
seeing justice served on the parties who brutally tortured and mur-
dered Agent Camarena; however, the devastation to peace and re-
spect among nations and the integrity of the United States is not
worth the shallow reward of retribution. The decision demonstrates
that the United States may profit by conduct that would be illegal for
any of its citizens. Kidnapping is illegal whether done for a ransom
or for a vigilante sense of justice. In order for the United States to
retain its citizens' and the world's respect as a leader in human rights
and democracy, the government must act within the boundaries of
the law and demonstrate its loyalty to the treaties it signs. To pro-
mote respect among other nations, the United States must act as an
example. "Society is the ultimate loser when, in order to convict the
guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law.' 48
In addition, the United States cannot hope that other signatory
nations will abide by their treaties if the United States is seen as a
country that will live by its treaties only when it formally invokes
them; otherwise, it feels free to act outside any treaty. By the Court's
decision, all possibilities must be provided for in a treaty, or the
seemingly improbable action may occur and not be in violation of
the treaty. The interests of protecting the sovereignty of nations and
of upholding treaty obligations must prevail over rigid formalism
and an executive policy of vigilante justice. As Thomas Paine warned
over two hundred years ago:
'an avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty' because it leads a
Nation to 'stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of
laws.' To counter this tendency, .. . [we must be mindful that] '[h]e
that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy
145 Mary Benanti, Panel Considers Ban on Foreign Kidnapping, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE,
July 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curr. File. Rep. Leon Panetta, D-Cal., is
leading the fight for this legislation.
146 Id.
147 Beyond Wild West Justice, THE WASH. POST, July 26, 1991, at A22.
148 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 274.
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from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a prece-
dent that will reach to himself.'1
49
Sadly, Thomas Paine was ignored first by the DEA and then by the
majority of the Supreme Court.
CANDACE R. SOMERS
149 Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2206 (1992)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(quoting 2
THE COMPLETE WRMNGS OF THOMAS PAINE 588 (P. Foner ed. 1945)).
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